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Economists’  views  of  the  Phillips  curve  concept 
have  changed  drastically  in  recent  years.  The  orig- 
inal  interpretation  of  the  Phillips  curve  as  a  stable 
trade-off  relationship  between  inflation  and  unem- 
ployment  has  given  way  to  the  view  that  no  such 
trade-off  esists  for  policymakers  to  esploit.  As  a 
result,  some  economists  now  argue  that  economic 
stabilization  policies  are  incapable  of  influencing 
output  and  employment,  even  in  the  short-run. 
Instrumental  to  this  change  were  several  key  de- 
velopments  in  Phillips  curve  analysis,  most  notably 
the  so-called  natzrral  rate  and  rational  expectations 
hypotheses.  The  purpose  of  this  article  is to  esplain 
these  developments  and  their  policy  implications  and 
to  show  how  they  altered  economists  perceptions  of 
the  Phillips  curve.  Accordingly,  the  first  half  of  the 
article  traces  the  evolution  of  Phillips  curve  analysis 
focusing  particularly  on  the  natural  rate  hypothesis. 
The  second  half  concentrates  on  the  rational  expec- 
tations  idea,  currently  the  most  hotly-debated  aspect 
of  Phillips  curve  analysis. 
Early  Versions  of  the  Phillips  Curve  Phillips 
curve  analysis  has  evolved  through  at  least  five  major 
stages  since  its  inception  in  19%.  The  first  stage 
involved  the  formulation  of  a  simple,  stable  trade-off 
relation  between  inflation  and  unemployment.  The 
initial  Phillips  curve  depicted  a  relationship  between 
money  wage  changes  and  unemployment.  But  the 
assumption  that  product  prices  are  set  by  applying  a 
constant  mark-up  to  unit  labor  costs  permitted  the 
Phillips  relationship  to  be  transformed  into  a  price- 
change  equation  of  the  form1 
(1)  p=ax 
where  p is  the  percentage  rate  of  price  inflation,  x  is 
overall  excess  demand  in  labor  and  hence  product 
markets-this  excess  demand  being  proxied  by  the 
inverse  of  the  unemployment  rate-and  a  is  a  coeffi- 
1 For  simplicity,  the  additive  constant  term  contained  in 
most  empirical  Phillips  curve  equations  is  disregarded  in 
equation  1. 
cient  espressing  the  numerical  value  of  the  trade-off 
between  inflation  and  excess  demand. 
This  equation  expresses  the  early  view  of  the 
Phillips  curve  as  ;i  stable,  enduring  trade-off  per- 
mitting  the  authorities  to  0l)tnin  permanently  lowel 
rates  of  unemployi~lcnt  in  eschange  for  l~ermnnently 
higher  rates  of  inflation  or  vice-versa.  Put  differ- 
ently.  the  equation  was popularly  interpreted  as offer- 
111g  a  menu  of  alternative  inflation-u~ien~l~loylnent 
coml~inntions  from  which  the  authorities  could  choose. 
Being  stable.  the  menu  never  changed. 
Economists  soon  discovered,  however,  that  the 
menu  was  not  as  staljle  as  originally  thought  ant1 
that  the  Phillil~s  curve  had  a  tendency  to  shift  over 
time.2  Accordingly.  the  equation  was augmented  wit11 
additional  variables  to  account  for  such  movements. 
Introduction  of  Shift  Variables  The  addition  of 
shift  variables  to  the  trade-off  equation  marked  the 
second  stage  of  Phillips  curve  analysis.  The  inclu- 
sion  of  these  variables  meant  that  the  Phillips  equa- 
tion  could  now  be  written  as 
(2)  P  =ax+z 
where  z is a vector  of variables-productivity,  profits, 
trade  union  effects,  unemployment  dispersion  and  the 
like-capable  of  shifting  the  inflation-excess  demand 
trade-off.  Absent  at  this  stage  were  variables  repre- 
senting  price  expectations.  Although  the  past  rate  of 
price  change  was  sometimes  used  as  a  shift  variable, 
it  was  rarely  interpreted  as  a  proxy  for  anticipated 
inflation.  Not  until  the  late  1960’s were  expectational 
variables  fully  incorporated  into  Phillips  curve  equa- 
tions.  By  then,  of  course,  inflationary  expectations 
had  become  too  prominent  to  ignore  and  many  ana- 
lysts  were  perceiving  them  as  the  dominant  cause  of 
observed  shifts  in  the  Phillips  curve. 
The  Expectations-Augmented  Phillips  Curve  and 
the  Adaptive-Expectations  Mechanism  Three  in- 
novations  ushered  in the  next  stage  of  Phillips  curve 
2 Indeed,  Phillips  himself  in  his  1958  article  had  recog- 
nized  the  possibility  of  such  shifts. 
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excess  demand  variable.  Originally  defined  as  the 
inverse  of  the  unemployment  rate,  excess  demand 
was  redefined  as  the  discrepancy  between  actual  and 
normal  capacity  real  output  or,  equivalently,  as  the 
gap  between  the  actual  and  the  natural  rates  of  unem- 
ployment.  The  natural  rate  of  unempIoyment  itself 
was  defined  as  the  rate  that,  given  the  frictions  and 
structural  characteristics  of  the  economy,  is just  con- 
sistent  with  demand-supply  equilibrium  in  labor  and 
product  markets.  This  innovation  effectively  identi- 
fied  full-employment  equilibrium  (i.e.,  zero  excess 
demand  j  with  normal  capacity  output  and  the  natural 
rate  of  unemployment. 
The  second  innovation  was  the  introduction  of 
price  anticipations  into  Phillips  curve  analysis  re- 
sulting  in  the  expectations-augmented  equation 
(3)  p  =  ax  -/-  pe 
where  pe  is  the  price  expectations  variable  repre- 
senting  the  anticipated  rate  of  inflation.  This  espec- 
tations  variable  entered  the  equation  with  a  coeffi- 
cient  of  unity,  reflectin  g  the  assumption  that  price 
expectations  are  completely  incorporated  in  actual 
price  changes.  The  unit  expectations  coefficient  im- 
plies  the  absence  of money  illusion,  i.e.,  it  implies  that 
sellers  are  concerned  with  the  expected  real  pur- 
chasing  power  of  the  prices  they  receive  and  so  take 
anticipated  inflation  into  account.  As  will  be  shown 
later,  the  unit  expectations  coefficient  also  implies 
the  complete  absence  of  a  trade-off  between  inflation 
and  unemployment  in the  long-run  when  espectations 
are  fully  realized.  Sate  also  that  the  expectations 
variable  is the  sole  shift  variable  in  the  equation.  All 
other  shift  variables  have  been  omitted,  reflecting  the 
view,  prevalent  in  the  early  1970’s,  that  changing 
price  expectations  were  the  predominant  cause  of 
observed  shifts  in  the  Phillips  curve. 
The  third  innovation  was  the  incorporation  of  an 
expectations-generating  mechanism  into  Phillips 
curve  analysis  to  explain  how  the  price  espectations 
variable  itself  is  determined.  Generally  a  simple 
adaptive  expectations  or  error-leavning  mechanism 
was  used.  According  to  this  mechanism,  expecta- 
tions  are  adjusted  (adapted)  by  some  fraction  of  the 
error  that  occurs  when  inflation  turns  out  to  be 
different  than  expected.  In  symbols 
(4)  $  =  b(p  -  p”) 
where  the  dot  over  the  expectations  variable  indicates 
the  rate  of  change  (time  derivative)  of  that  variable, 
P  -  pe is  the  expectations  error  (i.e.,  the  difference 
between  actual  and  expected  price  inflation),  and  1, 
is  the  adjustment  fraction.  Assuming,  for  example, 
an  adjustment  fraction  of  r/z,  equation  4  says  that  iE 
the  actual  and  expected  rates  of  inflation  are  10 per- 
cent  and  4  percent,  respectively-i.e.,  the  expecta- 
tional  error  is  6  percent-then  the  expected  rate  of 
inifation  will  be  revised  upward  by  an  amount  equaS 
to  half  the  error,  or  3  percent.  Such  revision  wil.1 
continue  until  the  expectational  error  is  eliminated. 
ft  can  also  be  shown  that  equation  4  is  equivalent  to 
the  proposition  that  expected  inflation  is  a  geometri- 
cally-weighted  average  of  all  past  rates  of  inflation 
with  the  weights  summing  to  one.  Therefore,  the 
error-learning  mechanism  can  also  be  expressed  as 
(9  Pe =  2  Wi p-i 
where  Z  indicates  the  operation  of  summing  the 
weighted  past  rates  of  inflation,  i  represents  past 
time  periods,  and  \vi stands  for  the  weights  attached 
to  past  rates  of  inflation.  These  weights  deciine 
geometrically  as time  recedes,  i.e.,  people  are  assumed 
to  give  more  attention  to  recent  than  to  older  price 
experience  when  forming  expectations.  How  fast  the 
weights  fall  depends  on  the  strength  of  people’s 
memories  of  inflationary  history.  Rapidly  declining 
weights  indicate  that  people  have  short  memories  so 
that  price  espectations  depend  primarily  on  recent 
price  experience.  By  contrast,  slowly  declini:ng 
weights  imply  long  memories  so that  expectations  are 
influenced  significnnrly  by  inflation  rates  of  the  more 
distant  past.  Both  versions  of  the  adaptive  especta- 
tions  mechanism  (i.e.,  equations  4 and  5)  were  com- 
bined  with  the  expectations-augmented  Phillips 
equation  to  explain  the  mutual  interaction  of  actual 
inflation,  expected  inflation,  and  excess  demand. 
The  Natural  Rate  Hypothesis  These  three  inno- 
vations-  the  redefined  excess  demand  variable,  ,the 
expectations-augmented  trade-off,  and  the  adaptive- 
expectations  mechanism-formed  the  basis  of  the 
so-called  natural  rate  and  acceleration&t  hypotheses 
that  radically  altered  economists’  views  of  the  Pinil- 
lips  curve.  According  to  the  natural  rate  hypothesis, 
there  exists  no  permanent  trade-off  between  unem- 
ployment  and  inflation  since  real  economic  variables 
tend  to  be  independent  of  nominal  ones  in  long-,run 
equilibrium,  To  be  sure,  trade-offs  may  exist  in  the 
short-run.  But  they  are  inherently  transitory  phe- 
nomena  that  stem  from  unexpected  inflation  and  that 
vanish  when  expectations  adjust  to  inflationary  ex- 
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disappear  and  expectations  are  realized,  unemploy- 
ment  r.eturns  to  its  natural  (equilibrium)  rate.  This 
rate  is  consistent  with  all  full\-a1lticipnted  steady- 
state  rates  of  inflation,  implying  that  the  long-run 
Phillips  curve  is  a  vertical  line  at  the  natural  rate  of 
unemployment. 
Equation  3’  embodies  these  conclusions.  That 
equation,  when  rearranged  to  read  1) -  1)” =  ;IS, 
states  that  the  trade-off  is  between  unc.r@c-ted  infln- 
tion  (the  difference  het\veen  actual  and  espected 
inflation  p  -  p”)  and  excess  demand.  The  equation 
also  says  that  the  trade-off  disappears  \vhen  inflation 
is fully  anticipated,  i.e.,  when  p  -  I)(’  is  zero.  More- 
over,  if  the  equation  is  correct.  excess  demand  nmst 
also  be  zero  at  this  point,  \Yhich  implies  that  unem- 
ployment  is  at  its  natural  rare.  Zero  escess  demantl 
and  the  natural  rate  of  unemployment  are  therefore 
compatible  with  0~2~1  rate  oi  inflation  l~ro~itletl  it  is 
fully  anticipated.  In  short,  equation  3 asserts  that  if 
inflation  is  fully  anticipated  there  will  be  no  rela- 
tionship  between  inflation  and  ~u~enll~loyment.  con- 
trary  to  the  original  Phillips  hypothesis. 
The  Accelerationist  Hypothesis  Equation  3. 
when  combined  with  equation  4,  also  yields  the 
accelerationist  hypothesis.  The  latter,  a  corollary  of 
the  natural  rate  hypothesis.  states  that  since  there 
exists  no  long-run  trade-off  between  unemployment 
and  inflation,  attempts  to  peg  the  former  variable 
below  its  natural  (equilibrium)  level  must  produce 
ever-accelerating  inflation.  Such  acceleration  will 
keep  actual  inflation  always  running  ahead  of  ex- 
pected  inflation,  thereby  perpetuating  the  inflationary 
surprises  that  prevent  unemployment  from  returning 
to  its  equilibrium  level. 
These  conclusions  are  easily  demonstrated.  As 
previously  mentioned,  equation  3  states  that  excess 
demand  can  differ  from  zero  only  as  long  as  actual 
inflation  deviates  from  expected  inflation.  But  equa- 
tion  4  says  that,  by  the  very  nature  of  the  error- 
learning  mechanism,  such  deviations  cannot  persist 
unless  inflation  is  continually  accelerated  so  that  it 
always  stays  ahead  of  expected  inflation.  If  inflation 
is  not  accelerated,  but  instead  stays  constant,  then 
the  gap  between  actual  and  expected  inflation  will 
eventually  be  closed.  Therefore  acceleration  is  re- 
quired  to  keep  the  gap  open  if  excess  demand  is  to 
be  maintained  above  its  natural  equilibrium  level  of 
zero.  In  other  words,  the  long-run  trade-off  implied 
by  the  accelerationist  hypothesis  is  between  excess 
demand  and  the  rate  of  acceleration  of  the  inflation 
rate,  in  contrast  to  the  conventional  trade-off  be- 
tween  excess  demand  and  the  inflation  rate  itself  as 
in1pIied  lty  the  original  Phillips  curve.3 
Policy  Implications  of  the  Natural  Rate  and  Ac- 
celerationist  Hypotheses  ?-IL-•  policy  iml)lication~ 
stem  from  the  :zatural  rate  and  nccelerntionist  propo- 
sitions.  First,  7lie authorities  can  either  peg  uneni- 
l)lo\7nent  or  st;:!Glize  inflation  Imt  not  botll.  If  they 
Ileg  ~uierlll)lo\-1:-.ent.  tile\-  will  ultiiii;~tely  lose  control 
0i  inilntion  s&c  the  latter  eventually  accelerates 
\vlien  ullerill)io~;xiiciit is  held  below  its  natural  level. 
:\lteriiati\.el~.  ii  tllc!.  st:il)ilizc  the  inflation  rate.  the!. 
will  lose  control  of  uneniplo~i~lent  since  the  l;ittcl 
\vill  return  to  irs  nattu-31 level  :\t  :uiy  stcatly  r:ltc  of 
inilzltioii.  ‘f11ar.i. contr:~r>  to  tllc  origin:11  I’liillil~s 
li~~l)otllcsis. rl1ey  cannot  l)cg  ~1i1eIliI)lo!.lllelli  at  :~nj 
constant  rate  oi  inflation. 
i\  secontl  ])o:ic-y  itiiplication  steniming  froii~  cclw- 
tiuns  3 and  4  i;  tllat  llic  :tutlioritics  can  choose  froill 
;111ioi1g  alterll:!:ivc  tr:tllsitioll;li  :~(ljustiiicnt  l):ltlis  to 
tlie  tlesirctl  stc;:dy-state  r:lte  of  iiifkltion.  suppose 
tlx  authorities  u4sli  to  nio~c  to  a  lowci-  t:u-get  infh- 
tion  rxte.  To  do  so  they  must  lower  infl:ttionq 
espectntioiis.  a :ilajor  coiilporlent  of the  inflation  rate. 
But  equ:ltions  .; and  4  stntc  that  the  only  way  to  do 
this  is to  create  sI;~ck cal)acity  (csccss  sul)l)ly)  iI1 tllc 
econoni\~.  thus  carlsin,  cr the  actual  rate  of  inflation  to 
fall  belo\v  the  esl,ectetl  rate,  inducing  a  tlown\v;~rtl 
revision  of  the  latter.  The  ecluations  also  intlic;~te 
that  the  speed  of  ;itljustment  depeiitls  on  the  ;uiiount 
of  slack  crentec.  1lucli  slack  nie;ms  fast  adjustmcnt 
and  a  relntivel:b-  rapid  attainment  of  the  inflation 
target.  Conversel\;,  little  slack  means  sluggish  ntl- 
justment  and  rdatively  slow  attainment  of  the  infla- 
tion  target.  Thus  the  policy  choice  is between  adjust- 
ment  paths  offering  high  unemployment  for  a  short 
time  or  lower  unemployment  for  a  long  time. 
Statistical  Tests  of  the  Natural  Rate  Hypothesis 
The  fourth  stage  of  Phillips  curve  analysis  involved 
statistical  testing  of  the  natural  rate  hypothesis. 
3 The  proof  is  simple.  Equation  3  states  a  relationship 
among  actual  kflation,  expected  inflation,  and  excess 
demand.  From  that  equation  it  follows  that  the  rela- 
tionship  among  the  rates  of  change  of  those  variables  is 
given  by  the  espression  i  =  ai  +  p”  where  the  dots 
indicate  rates  of  change  (time  derivatives)  of  the  attached 
variables.  Sukituting  equation  4  into  this  expression 
yields  b  =  a;  +  b(p-pe),  which,  by  equation  3’s  as- 
sertion  that  the  expectational  error  p  -  pe  is  equal  to  ax, 
further  simplifies  to  b  =  a&  +  bax.  Finally,  if  excess 
demand  is  unchanging  so  that  k  is  zero-as  would  be 
the  case  if  the  acthorities  were  pegging  x  at  some  desired 
level-this  last  espression  reduces  to  i  =  bax  showing  a 
trade-off  relation  between  the  rate  of  acceleration  of 
inflation  b  and  excess  demand  x, 
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tions  or  error-learning  model  of  inflationary  expecta- 
tions  and  thus  helped  prepare  the  way  for  the  intro- 
duction  of  the  alternative  rationaI-expectations  idea 
into  Phillips  curve  analysis. 
The  tests  themselves  were  mainly  concerned  with 
estimating  the  numerical  value  of  the  coefficient  on 
the  price-expectations  variable  in  the  expectations- 
augmented  Phillips  curve  equation.  If  the  coefficient 
is  one,  as  in  equation  3.  then  the  natural  rate  hy- 
pothesis  is valid  and  no  long-run  inflation-unemploy- 
ment  trade-off  exists  for  the  policymakers  to  exploit. 
But  if the  coefficient  is less  than  one,  the  natural  rate 
hypothesis  is  refuted  and  a  long-run  trade-off  exists. 
This  can  be  seen  by  writing  the  expectations-aug- 
mented  equation  as 
(6)  P =  ax  +  CPP” 
where  (p is  the  coefficient  attached  to  the  price  ex- 
pectations  variable.  In  long-run  equihbrium,  of 
course,  expected  inflation  equals  actual  inflation,  i.e., 
P”  =  p.  Setting  expected  inflation  equal  to  actual 
inflation  as  required  for  long-run  equilibrium  and 
solving  for  the  actual  rate  of  inflation  yields 
(7)  p(l  -  (p)  =  ax. 
This  shows  that  a  long-run  trade-off  exists  onIy  if 
the  expectations  coefficient  is  less  than  one.  If  the 
coefficient  is  one,  however,  the  trade-off  vanishes. 
Many  of  the  empirical  tests  estimated  the  coeffi- 
cient  to  be  less  than  unity  and  concluded  that  the 
natural  rate  hypothesis  was  invalid.  But  this  conclu- 
sion  was  sharply  challenged  by  economists  who  con- 
tended  that  the  tests  contained  statistical  bias  that 
tended  to  work  against  the  natural  rate  hypothesis. 
These  critics  pointed  out  that  the  tests  invariably  used 
adaptive-expectations  schemes  as  empirical  prosies 
for  the  unobservable  price  expectations  variable. 
They  further  showed  that  if  these  proxies  were  in- 
appropriate  measures  of  expectations  then  estimates 
of  the  expectations  coefficient  could  well  be  biased 
downward.  If  so,  then  estimated  coefficients  of  less 
than  one  constituted  no  disproof  of  the  natural  rate 
hypothesis. 
Finally,  the  critics  argued  that  the  adaptive-expec- 
tations  scheme  is  a  grossly  inaccurate  representation 
of  how  people  formulate  price  expectations.  They 
pointed  out  that  it  postulates  naive  expectational  be- 
havior,  holding  as  it  does  that  people  form  antici- 
pations  solely  from  a  weighted  average  of  past  price 
experience  with  weights  that  are  fixed  and  inde- 
pendent  of  economic  conditions  and  policy  actions. 
This  implies  that  people  look  only  at  past  price 
changes  and  ignore  all  other  pertinent  information-. 
e.g.,  money  growth  rate  changes,  exchange  rate  move- 
ments,  announced  policy  intentions  and  the  like-- 
that  could  be  used  to  reduce  expectational  errors.  11: 
seems  implausible  that  people  would  fail  to exploit  in- 
formation  that  would  improve  expectational  accuracy. 
In  short,  the  critics  contended  that’adaptive  expecta- 
tions  are  not  wholly  rational  if  other  information 
besides  past  price  changes  can  improve  predictions. 
Xany  economists  have  since  pointed  out  that  it  is 
hard  to  accept  the  notion  that  individuals  would 
form  price  anticipations  from  any  scheme  that  is 
inconsistent  with  the  way  inflation  is  actually  gen- 
erated  in the  economy.  Being  different  from  the  true 
inflation-generating  mechanism,  such  schemes  will 
produce  expectations  that  are  systematically  wrong. 
If  so,  rational  agents  will  cease  to  use  them.  For 
example,  suppose  inflation  were  actually  accelerating 
or  decelerating.  According  to  equation  4,  the  adap- 
tive  expectations  model  would  systematically  under- 
estimate  the  inflation  rate  in  the  former  case  and 
overestimate  it  in  the  latter.  Perceiving  these  per- 
sistent  expectationa  mistakes,  rational  agents  wou1.d 
quickly  abandon  the  error-learning  model  for  more 
accurate  expectations-generating  schemes.  Once 
again,  the  adaptive-expectations  mechanism  is  im- 
plausible  because  of  its  incompatibility  with  rational 
behavior, 
From  Adaptive  Expectations  to  Rational  Expec- 
tations  The  shortcomings  of  the  adaptive  expec- 
tations  approach  to  the  modeling  of  expectations  led 
to the  incorporation  of  the  so-called  rational  expecta- 
tions  approach  into  Phillips  curve  analysis.  Accord- 
ing  to  the  rational  expectations  hypothesis,  individ: 
uals  will  tend  to  exploit  a-l1  the  pertinent  information 
about  the  inflationary  process  when  making  their 
price  forecasts.  If  true,  this  means  that  forecasti:ng 
errors  ultimateIy  could  arise  only  from  random  (u.n- 
foreseen)  shocks  occurring  to  the  economy.  At  first, 
of  course,  forecasting  errors  could  also  arise  because 
individuals  initially  possess  limited  or  incomplete 
information  about  the  inflationary  mechanism.  Elut 
it  is  unlikely  that  this  latter  condition  would  persist. 
For  if  the  public  is  truly  rational,  it  will  quickly 
learn  from  these  infIationary  surprises  and  incor- 
porate  the  new  information  into  its  forecasting  p:ro- 
cedures,  i.e.,  the  sources  of  forecasting  mistakes  will 
be  swiftly  perceived  and  systematically  eradicated. 
As  knowledge  of  the  inflationary  process  improves, 
forecasting  models  will  be  continually  revised  to  pro- 
duce  more  accurate  predictions.  Eventually  all  sys- 
tematic  (predictable)  elements  influencing  the  rate 
of  inflation  will  become  known  and  fully  understood, 
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most  accurate  (unbiased)  forecast  consistent  with 
that  knowledge.4  When  this  happens  people’s  price 
expectations  will  be  the  same  as those  implied  by  the 
actual  inflation-generating  mechanism.  As  incor- 
porated  in  natural-rate  Phillips  curve  models,  the 
rational-expectations  hypothesis  implies  that  there- 
after,  except  for  unavoidable  surprises  due  to  purely 
random  shocks,  price  expectations  will  always  be 
correct  and  the  economy  will  always  be  at  its  long- 
run  steady-state  equilibrium. 
Policy  Implications  of  Rational  Expectations 
The  strict  rational-expectations  approach  has  some 
radical  policy  implications.  It  implies  that  systematic 
policies-i.e.,  those  based  on  feedback  control  rules 
defining  the  authorities’  response  to  changes  in  the 
economy--cannot  influence  real  variables  even  in  the 
short-run,  since  people  would  have  already  antici- 
pated  what  the  policies  are  going  to  be  and  acted 
upon  those  anticipations.  To  have  an  impact  on 
output  and  employment  the  authorities  must  be  able 
to  create  a  divergence  between  actual  and  expected 
inflation.  This  follows  from  the  proposition  that 
inflation  influences  real  variables  only  when  it  is 
unanticipated.  The  authorities  must  be  able  to  alter 
the  actual  rate  of  inflation  without  simultaneously 
causing  an  identical  change  in  the  expected  future 
rate.  This  may  be  impossible  if  the  public  can  pre- 
dict  policy  actions. 
Policy  actions,  to  the  extent  they  are  systematic, 
are  predictable.  Systematic  policies  are  simply  rules 
or  response  functions  relating  policy  variables  to 
lagged  values  of  other  variables.  These  policy  re- 
sponse  functions  can  be  estimated  and  incorporated 
into  forecasters’  price  predictions.  In  other  words, 
rational  agents  can  use  past  observations  on  the  be- 
havior  of  the  authorities  to  predict  future  policy 
moves.  Then,  on  the  basis  of  these  predictions,  they 
can  correct  for  the  effect  of  anticipated  policies  be- 
forehand  by  making  appropriate  adjustments  to 
nominal  wages  and  prices.  Consequently,  when  sta- 
bilization  actions  do  occur,  they  will  have  no  impact 
on  real  variables  since  they  will  have  been  discounted 
and  neutralized  in  advance.  The  only  conceivable 
way  that  policy  can  have  even  a  short-run  influence 
on  real  variables  is  for  it  to  be  unexpected,  i.e.,  the 
4 Put  differently,  rationality  implies  that  current  expec- 
tational  errors  are  uncorrelated  with  past  errors  and  all 
other  known  information,  such  correlations  already  hav- 
ing  been  perceived  and  eliminated  in  the  process  of 
improving  price  forecasts. 
policymakers  must  either  act  in  an  unpredictable 
random  fashion  or  secretly  change  the  policy  reac- 
tion  function.  Apart  from  such  tactics,  which  are 
incompatible  with  most  notions  of  the  proper  conduct 
of  public  policy,  there  is  no  way  the  authorities  can 
influence  real  variables.  They  can,  however,  influ- 
ence  a  nominal  variable,  namely  the  inflation  rate, 
and  should  concentrate  their  efforts  on  doing  so  if 
some  particular  rate  is  desired. 
To  summarize,  the  rationality  hypothesis  denies 
the  existence  of  exploitable  Phillips  curve  trade- 
offs  in  the  short-run  as  well  as  the  long.  In  so 
doing  it  differs  from  the  adaptive  expectations 
version  of  natural-rate  Phillips  curve  models. 
Under  adaptive  expectations,  short-run  trade-offs 
esist  because  expectations  do  not  adjust  instanta- 
neously  to  policy-engineered  changes  in  the  in- 
flation  rate.  With  expectations  adapting  to  actual 
inflation  with  a  lag,  monetary  policy  can’ generate 
unexpected  inflation  and  consequently  influence  real 
variables  in  the  short-run.  This  cannot  happen 
under  rational  expectations  where  both  actual  and 
expected  inflation  adjust  identically  and  instanta- 
neously  to anticipated  policy  changes.  In  short,  under 
rational  expectations,  systematic  policy  cannot  induce 
the  expectational  errors  that  generate  short-run 
Phillips  curves. 
A  Simple  Illustrative  Model  The  preceding  argu- 
ments  can  be  clarified  with  the  aid  of  a  simple  illus- 
trative  model.  The  model  contains  five  relationships 
including  an  expectations-augmented  Phillips  curve 
equation,  an  inflation-generating  mechanism,  a policy 
reaction  function,  a  rational  price  expectations  equa- 
tion,  and  finally  a  rational  money-growth  expecta- 
tions  equation.  Taken  together,  these  equations  show 
that  deterministic  policies,  by  virtue  of  their  very 
predictability,  cannot  induce  the  expectational  errors 
that  generate  short-run  Phillips  curves.  Phillips 
curves  may  exist,  to  be  sure.  But  they  are  entirely 
the  result  of unpredictable  random  shocks  and  cannot 
be  exploited  by  policies  based  on  rules.  In  sum,  the 
model  shows  that,  given  expectational  rationality  and 
the  natural  rate  hypothesis,  systematic  trade-offs  are 
impossible  in  the  short-run  as  well  as  the  long.5 
5 Note  that  the  rational  expectations  hypothesis  also  rules 
out  the  acceleration&  notion  of  a  stable  trade-off  be- 
tween  excess  demand  and  the  rate  of  acceleration  of  the 
inflation  rate.  If  expectations  are  formed  consistent  with 
the  way  inflation  is  actually  generated,  the  authorities 
will  not  be  able  to  fool  people  by  accelerating  inflation  or 
by  accelerating  the  rate  of  acceleration,  etc.  Indeed,  no 
systematic  policy  will  work  if  expectations  are  formed 
consistently  with  the  way  inflation  is  actually  generated 
in  the  economy. 
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the  model  is  the  expectations-augmented  Phillips 
curve  quation 
(8)  p  -  p” =  ax 
that  expresses  a  trade-off  relationship  between  unes- 
petted  inflation  and  real  escess  demand.  In  the 
rational  expectations  literature  this  equation  is  often 
treated  as  an  aggregate  supply  function  stating  that 
firms  produce  the  normal  capacity  level  of  output 
when  actual  and  expected  inflation  are  equal  but 
produce  in  excess  of  that  level  when  fooied  by  unex- 
pected  inflation.  This  view  holds  that  firms  mistake 
Kianticipated  general  price  increases  for  rises  in  the 
particular  (relative)  price  of  their  own  products. 
Surprised  by  inflation,  they  treat  the  price  increase 
as  special  to  themselves  and  so  expand  output. 
An  alternative  interpretation  of  the  equation  treats 
it  as  a price-setting  relation  according  to  which  busi- 
nessmen  raise  their  prices  at  the  rate  at  which  they 
expect  other  businessmen  to  be  raising  theirs  and 
then  adjust  that  rate  upward  if  excess  demand  ap- 
pears.  Either  interpretation  yields  the  same  result. 
Expectational  errors  cause  real  economic  activity  to 
deviate  from  its  normal  capacity  level.  The  devi- 
ations  disappear  when  the  errors  vanish. 
Inflation-Generating  Mechanism  The  next  rela- 
tionship  describes  how  inflation  is  generated  in  the 
model.  M’ritten  as  follows 
(9)  p  =  m  +  E 
it  expresses  the  rate  of  inflation  as  the  sum  of  the 
growth  rate  of  money  m  per  unit  of  capacity  real 
output  and  a  random  shock  variable  E, the  latter  as- 
sumed  to  have  a mean  (expected)  value  of  zero.  The 
capacity-adjusted  money  growth  rate  is  simply  the 
difference  between  the  respective  growth  rates  of  the 
nominal  money  stock  and  capacity  real  output,  the 
latter  variable  serving  as  a  prosy  for  the  trend  rate 
of  growth  of the  real  demand  for  money.  In  essence, 
equation  9  says  that  while  the  rate  of  inflation  is 
determined  basicalIy  by  the  growth  rate  of  money 
per  unit  of  capacity  output,  it  is  also  influenced  by 
transitory  disturbances  unrelated  to  money  growth. 
For  convenience,  it  is  assumed  in  what  follows  that 
the  growth  rate  of  capacity  output  is zero  so  that  the 
capacity-adjusted  money  growth  rate  is  identical  to 
the  growth  rate  of  the  nominal  money  stock  itself. 
Policy  Reaction  Function  The  third  ingredient 
of  the  model  is a policy-reaction  function  stating  how 
the  monetary  authorities  respond  to  changes  in  the 
level  of  economic  activity.  Written  as  follows 
.( 10)  m  =  m(x-l)  +  u 
it  states  that  the  currezlt  rate  of  money  growth  is  a 
function  of  last  period’s  excess  demand  x-~  and  a 
random  disturbance  term  u,  the  latter  assumed  to 
have  a  mean  value  of  zero.  The  interpretation  of  the 
equation  is  straightforward.  The  authorities  attempt 
to  adjust  money  growth  in  the  current  period  to 
correct  real  excess  demand  or  supply  occurring  in the 
preceding  period  according  to  the  feedback  control 
rule  m  =  m(x-l).  &1oney  growth  cannot  be  con- 
trolled  perfectly  by  the  feedback  rule,  however,  and 
the  slippage  is represented  by the  random  term  u  tha.t 
causes  money  growth  to  deviate  unpredictably  from 
the  path  intended  by  the  authorities.  Xote  that  the 
disturbance  term  u  can  also  represent  de1iberat.e 
monetary  surprises  engineered  by  the  policy  au- 
thorities. 
Price  Expectations  Equation  The  fourth  element 
of  the  model  is  a  price-expectations  equation  de- 
scribing  how  rational  inflationary  anticipations  are 
formed.  By  definition,  rational  expectations  are  the 
same  as  the  predictions  yielded  by  the  actual  infia- 
tion-generating  process,  represented  in  the  model  by 
equation  9.  And  since  that  equation  states  that  the 
actual  rate  of  inflation  is  equal  to  the  actual  money 
growth  rate  plus  a  random  variable,  it  follows  that 
the  espected  rate  of  inflation  predicted  by  the  equa- 
tion  is  equal  to  the  expected  money  growth  rate  plus 
the  expected  value  of  the  random  term.  The  latter, 
however,  is  zero  and  thus  drops  out,  leaving  antici- 
pated  inflation  equal  to  expected  money  growth.  ‘In 
synlbols 
(11)  pe =  me. 
Note  that  these  symbols  now  have  a  dual  interpreta- 
tion.  They  represent  anticipations  formulated  by  the 
public.  They  also  represent  mathematical  especl:a- 
tions-i.e.,  espected  (mean)  values  of  the  stochastic 
inflation  and  money  growth  variables-calculated 
from  a  model  that,  in  principle  at  feast,  is  a  true 
representation  of  the  inflationary  process.  Here  is 
the  essence  of  the  notion  that  people’s  expectations 
are  rational  when  they  are  the  same  as  those  implied 
by  the  relevant  economic  model.” 
6 Analysts  often  stress  this  point  by  expressing  antici- 
pated  inflation  formally  as  the  mathematical  expected 
value  of  the  actual  inflation  rate,  conditional  on  informa- 
tion  available  when  the  exwzctation  was  formed.  Sym- 
bolically,  pe  =  E(pj1)  where  E  is  the  mathemaf,ical 
expectation  and  I  is  known  information.  Since  this 
information  includes  the  inflation-generating  mechaniism 
summarized  by  equation  9,  it  iolloas  that  anticipated 
inflation  will  be  equal  to  the  mathematical  expectation 
of  that mechanism.  i.e.,  to  the  sum  of  the  expected  values 
of  the  money  growth  rate  and  the  random  term,  respec- 
tively. 
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rational  espectations  are  employed  to  determine  the 
anticipated  rate  of  monetary  growth.  Here  rational 
expectations  are  the  same  as  the  predictions  of  the 
actual  money  growth  generating  mechnnisii~,  repre- 
sented  in  the  model  by  equation  10  (the  policy- 
reaction  iunction).  Put  differently.  the  espectetl 
value  of  the  reaction  function  constitutes  the  rational 
espectation  of  money  growth.  .\ncl  since  the  func- 
tion  contains  a  systematic  (predictable)  component 
whose  expected  value  is  simply  itself  and  ;I rantlon~ 
term  with  an  expected  value  of  zero,  that  espectn- 
tion  is 
(12)  me  =  m(x-1). 
In  short,  the  anticipated  rate  of  monetary  gro\vtll  is 
given  by  the  predictable  component  of  the  policy- 
reaction  function.  Rational  agents  know  e\:erything 
in  the  policy-reaction  function  except  the  r-andonl 
element.  They  know  the  constant  terms,  the  coeffi- 
cients,  and  the  predetermined  variable.  They  use  all 
this  information  in  formulating  expectations  of  the 
rate  of  monetary  growth,  expectations  which  are 
given  by  equation  12. 
The  Reduced  Form  Equation  Equations  S-12 
constitute  the  fundamental  relationships  of  the  ra- 
tional-expectations  model.  The  model  can  be  con- 
densed  to  a  single  reduced-form  expression  by  sub- 
stituting  equations  9-12  into  equation  S  to  yield 
(13)  l  +u=ax 
which  states  that  Phillips  curve  trade-offs  result 
solely  from  inflationary  surprises  caused  by  random 
shocks.  Note  in  particular  that  only  that  part  of 
monetary  growth  arising  from  unpredictable  random 
disturbances  enters  equation  13.  The  systematic 
component  is  absent.  This  means  that  systematic 
monetary  policy  cannot  affect  real  economic  activity 
(as  represented  by  excess  demand  x).  Oniy  unex- 
pected  money  growth  matters. 
The  foregoing  implies  that  the  authorities  can  in- 
fluence  economic  activity  in  only  two  ways.  First, 
they  can  pursue  a  random  policy,  altering  monetary 
growth  in  a  haphazard  unpredictable  manner.  That 
is  to  say  they  can  manipulate  the  disturbance  term  u 
in  the  policy  reaction  function  in  a  totally  unpre- 
dictable  way.  Second,  they  can  secretly  change  the 
feedback  control  rule,  thereby  affecting  output  and 
employment  during  the  time  people  are  learning 
about  the  new  rule.  It  is unlikely,  however,  that  this 
latter  policy  would  prove  effective  for  very  long 
since  rational  agents  would  learn  to  predict  rule 
~hangcs  just  as  the)-  predict  the  rule.  This  leaves 
random  policy  :is  the  only  way  to  affect  economic 
activity.  Bj,:r  randomness  seen15  hardly  a  proper 
Imis  for  pul~lic  policy. 
To  suiiin17.5ze.  the  strict  r:ltioli~il-esl)ect:Itions  al>- 
l~roach  iniplies  That espectntiou:~l  errors  are  the  0111) 
source  0i  tleparturc  froul  steady-state  ecluilil)riuni. 
that  sjuc11  er-:-OX are  short-lived  and  rantlor~~. and 
that  systematic  llolic>  rules  will  li;ive  no  inipact  on 
real  varialJc5  sir:ce  those  rules  will  :Jre:~tly  be  full)- 
euil~otlietl  in  rational  price  espect:ttions.  Thus. 
except  for  nnp~edictalJe  r;intlol11 shocks,  steady-state 
equilibrium  ;:l\:~!:s  prevails  and  systematic  monetary 
changes  produce  no  surprises,  no  tlisnl~pointetl  espcc- 
tntions,  no  transitory  impacts  on  real  economic  ;ic- 
ti\.ity.  Trade-offs  are  totally  adventitious  plieuonicu:~ 
tliat  cannot  be esl)loitetl  1)~ systcniatic  1)olicy even  in 
the  short-run.  in  short,  no  role  remains  for  counter- 
cyclical  st:J)iiizztion  policy.  The  oni?  thing  such 
ljolicy  can  influence  is  the  rate  of  inflation,  whicli 
adjusts  immediately  to  esljected  changes  in  nione) 
growth.  Tile  full  effect  of  :mticil~atetl  policy  actions 
ivill  be  on  the  inflation  rate.  It  follows  that  the  au- 
thorities  should  concentrate  their  efforts  on  control- 
ling  this  varinhle  if  it  is desiral)Ie  to  do  so  since  they 
cannot  systematically  influence  real  variables. 
Evaluation  of  Rational  Expectations  The  pre- 
ceding  paragraphs  have  shown  what  happens  when 
rational  expectations  are  incorporated  into  a  model 
containing  feedback  policy  rules,  an  inflation-gener- 
ating  mechanism,  and  an  espectr\tions-augmented 
Phillips  curve  or  aggregate  supply  function  embody- 
ing  the  natural  rate  hypothesis.  An  evaluation  of 
the  rational-expectations  approach  is  now  in  order. 
One  advantage  of  the  rational-expectations  hy- 
pothesis  is  that  it  treats  espectations  iormation  as  a 
part  of  optimizing  behavior.  By  so  doing,  it  brings 
the  theory  of  price  anticipations  into  accord  with  the 
rest  of  economic  analysis.  The  latter  assumes  that 
people  behave  as rational  optimizers  in the  production 
and  purchase  of  goods,  in  the  choice  of  jobs,  and  in 
making  investment  decisions.  For  consistency,  it 
should  assume  the  same  regarding  expectational  be- 
havior. 
In  this  sense,  the  rational-expectations  theory  is 
superior  to  C-al  explanations,  all  of  which  imply 
that  expectations  are  always  consistently  wrong.  It 
is  the  only  theory  that  denies  that  people  make  sys- 
tematic  expectation  errors.  Note  that  it  does  not 
claim  that  people  possess  perfect  foresight  or  that 
their  expectations  are  always  accurate.  What  it  does 
claim  is  that  they  perceive  and  eliminate  regularities 
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cover  the  actual  inflation-generating  process  and  use 
it  in  forming  price  expectations.  And  with  rational 
expectations  the  same  as  the  mean  value  of  the  infla- 
tion-generating  process,  those  expectations  cannot  he 
wrong  on  average.  Any  errors  will  he  random,  not 
systematic.  The  same  cannot  be  said  for  other  es- 
pectations  schemes,  however.  Not  being  identical  to 
the  expected  value  of  true  inflation-generating  pro- 
cess,  those  schemes  will  produce  biased  espectations 
that  are  systematically  wrong. 
Biased  expectations  schemes  are  difficult  to  justify 
theoretically.  Systematic  mistakes  are  harder  to  ex- 
plain  than  is  rational  behavior.  True,  nobody  really 
knows  how  expectations  are  actually  formed.  But  a 
theory  that  says  that  forecasters  don’t  continually 
make  the  same  mistakes  seems  intuitively  more  plaus- 
ible  than  theories  that  imply  the  opposite.  Consider- 
ing  the  profits  to  be  made  from  improved  forecasts, 
it  seems  inconceivable  that  systematic  expectational 
errors  would  persist.  Somebody  would  surely  note 
the  errors,  correct  them,  and  profit  by  the  correction. 
Other  forecasters  would  make  simiiar  corrections. 
Together,  the  profit  motive  and  competition  would 
reduce  forecasting  errors  to  randomness. 
Criticism  of  the  RationaI-Expectations  Approach 
Despite  its  logic,  the  rational-expectations  approacl: 
has  many  critics.  Some  still  maintain  that  especta- 
tions  are  basicalIy  nonrational,  i.e.,  that  people  are 
too  stupid,  naive,  or  uninformed  to  formulate  un- 
biased  price  expectations.  A  variant  of  this  argu- 
ment  is that  expectational  rationality  will  be  attained 
only  after  a long  learning  period  during  which  expec- 
tations  wiil  be  nonrational. 
Most  of  the  criticism,  however,  is  directed  not  at 
the  rationality  assumption  per  se  but  rather  at  three 
other  assumptions  underlying  the  mtional-especta- 
tions  approach,  namely  the  assumptions  of  (1)  COSi- 
less  information,  (2)  no  policymaker  information 
advantage,  and  (3)  price  flexibility.  The  first  states 
that  information  used  to  form  rational  expectations 
can  be obtained  and  processed  costlesslp.  The  second 
holds  that  private  forecasters  possess  exactly  the 
same  information  as  the  authorities  regarding  the 
inflationary  process.  The  third  assumption  states 
that  prices  and  the  rate  of  inflation  respond  fully  and 
immediately  to  anticipated  changes  in  monetary 
growth  and  other  events.  In  effect.  this  last  assump- 
tion  denies  that  prices  are  sticky  and  costly  to  adjus:. 
Critics  maintain  that  all  of  these  assumptions  are 
implausible  and  that  if  any  are-violated  then  the 
strong  conclusions  of  the  rational-espectations  ap- 
preach  cease  to  hold.  In  particular,  if  the  assump- 
tions  are  violated  then  activist  policies  can  have  sys- 
tematic  effects  on  real  variables.  Indeed,  the  critics 
have  demonstrated  as  much  by  incorporating  con- 
straints  representing  information  costs,  policymaker 
informational  advantages,  and  sluggish  price  adjust- 
ment  into  rational-expectations  models  similar  to  the 
one  outlined  above. 
Proponents  of  the  rational-expectations  approach 
readily  admit  that  such  constraints  can  restore  the 
potency  of  activist  policies.  But  they  still  insist  that 
such  policies  are  inapl>ropriate  and  that  the  proper 
role  for  policy  is  not  to  systematically  influence  real 
activity  but  rather  to  neutralize  the  constraints.  Thu:; 
if people  form  biased  price  forecasts,  then  the  policy- 
makers  should  publish  unbiased  forecasts.  If  infor-. 
mation  is costly  to  collect  and  process,  then  a central 
authority  should  gather  it  and  make  it  avaiiable.  If 
the  policy  authorities  have  informational  advantages 
over  private  individuals,  they  should  make  that  infor- 
mation  public  rather  than  attempting  to  exploit  the 
advantage.  Finally,  if prices  are  sticky  and  costly  to 
adjust,  then  the  authorities  should  minimize  these 
price  adjustment  costs  by  following  policies  thai 
stabilize  the  general  price  level. 
In  short,  advocates  of  the  rational  expectations  ap- 
proach  argue  that  feasibility  alone  constitutes  insuffi- 
cient  justification  for  activist  policies.  Poiicies  should 
also  be  deskabie.  Activist  policies  hardly  satisfy  this 
latter  criterion  since  their  effectiveness  is  based  on 
deceiving  people  into  making  espectational  errors. 
The  proper  role  for  policy  is  not  to  influence  real 
activity  via  deception  but  rather  to  reduce  informa- 
tion  deficiencies  and  perhaps  also  to  minimize  the 
costs  of  adjusting  prices. 
Conclusion  This  article  has  examined  some  re- 
cent  developments  in  Phillips  curve  analysis.  The 
chief  conclusions  can  be  stated  succinctly.  The 
Phillips  curve  concept  has  changed  radically  over  the 
past  20  years  as  the  notion  of  a  stabie  enduring 
trade-off  has  given  way  to  the  view  that  no  such 
trade-off  exists  for  the  policymakers  to  exploit.  In- 
strumental  to  this  change  were  the  natural-rate  a2d 
rational-espectations  hypotheses,  respectively.  The 
former  attributes  trade-offs  solely  to  expectational 
errors  while  the  latter  holds  that  systematic  policies, 
by  virtue  of  their  very  predictability,  cannot  possibly 
generate  such  errors.  Taken  together,  the  two  hy- 
potheses  imply  that  systematic  policies  are  incapa’ble 
of  influencing  output  and  employment,  contrary  to 
the  claims  of  policy  activists.  True,  critics  of  the 
rational-expectations  model  have  shown  that  relax- 
ation  of  its  more  stringent  assumptions  restores  the 
22  ECONOMK  REVIEW,  JANUARY/FEBRUARY  1978 short-run  potency  of  stabilization  policy.  But  mem-  verdict  on  the  rational  expectations  approach,  one 
bers  of  the  rational-expectations  school  reply  that  must  at  least  agree  that  it  has  posed  a  provocative 
activist  policies  are  undesirable  in  any  case  since  challenge 
those  policies  must  rely  on  deception.  Whatever  the  policies. 
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